Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Pittsburgh Stadium and Exhibition Authority by Dumbroski, Chris
DePaul Journal of Sports Law 
Volume 7 
Issue 1 Fall 2010 Article 4 
Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Pittsburgh Stadium 
and Exhibition Authority 
Chris Dumbroski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp 
Recommended Citation 
Chris Dumbroski, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Pittsburgh Stadium and Exhibition 
Authority, 7 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 63 (2010) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jslcp/vol7/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Sports Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
THE PITTSBURGH STADIUM AND
EXHIBITION AUTHORITY
Chris Dumbroski*
I. INTRODUCTION
Sport stadiums exist as the modern Coliseums, a testament to the
popularity of American sports. Stadiums represent cities, fans and the
teams that play in them. Older stadiums, such as Boston's Fenway
Park, Chicago's Wrigley Field and Green Bay's Lambeau Field, con-
tinue to grow in stature and are popular tourist attractions.' However,
many once popular stadiums became out-dated and undesirable; this
trend held particularity true with stadiums build in the 1960s and
1970s. As teams outgrew stadiums, they pushed cities and states to
build new state-of-the-art stadiums with public funds. A majority of
cities complied; while other cities saw their sports teams leave. The
relocations of the Baltimore Colts to Indianapolis, the Cleveland
Browns to Baltimore and the Minnesota North Stars to Dallas2 are
examples of teams moving because of cities' reluctance to build new
complexes.3
Twice the Pittsburgh Pirates ("Pirates"), a Major League Baseball
("MLB") franchise, and the Pittsburgh Steelers ("Steelers"), a Na-
tional Football League ("NFL") franchise, joined the push for modern
* JD., 2010, DePaul University College of Law; LL.M. (taxation), expected 2011, Villanova
Law School. The author would like to thank Tony Colarusso and Chris Eiswerth for their help
and insights on this article.
1. Some cities desided to replace older classical style stadiums, with new state-of-the-art stadi-
ums. An example would be Detroit, which replaced Tiger Stadium with Comerica Park in 2000.
Despite many calls to save the stadium from destruction, it was demolished in 2008. See Neal
Rubin, Detroit Ignores Calls to Save Ballpark, DiETROIT NEWS, Mar. 26, 2006, http://www.
detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060326/OPINIONO3/603260337/1004/sports; Bill Mc-
Graw, Tiger Stadium's Demise Begins Today, DE.rion FREE PRESS, July 9, 2008, http://www.
freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080709/NEWS01/80709023/1048.
2. Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship Between Public Financing
of Sports Facilities and Quality of Life in America's Cities, 7 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 45, 46 (2001).
3. Contra Kenneth L. Shropshire, Sports Facilitiy Construction in the Coming Millennium: The
Lawyers Role, 16 Ewr & Spowrs LAW. 1, 26 (1998) (on the other hand, Washington D.C. resisted
the National Football League's Redskins' demands for a new stadium. Eventually, the Redskins'
owner built a new stadium in the D.C. area with his own money).
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stadiums.4 In 1909, the Pirates began playing in Forbes Field, which
also became the Steelers' home in 1933.5 The teams shared the sta-
dium until the 1960s. 6  In the mid-1960s, the Pirates and Steelers
pushed for a new stadium.7 The City granted the teams their wish, and
built Three Rivers Stadium ("Three Rivers"), which opened in 1970.8
For thirty years, Three Rivers sat as a monument to Pittsburgh
sports. The Steelers hosted seven American Football Conference
Championship games,9 and the Pirates won two World Series, while
playing in Three Rivers.10 Eventually, the Pirates, the Steelers and the
people of Pittsburgh outgrew their love for the Three Rivers. By the
1990s, the people of Pittsburgh considered Three Rivers an outdated
eyesore." In conjunction with a national trend of new stadium open-
ings, the Pirates and Steelers made a push for new separate stadi-
ums.12  After a failed referendum and much debate, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the "Commonwealth") and City of
Pittsburgh (the "City") agreed to publically finance two new stadiums:
the Pirates' PNC Park and the Steelers' Heinz Field. As construction
started, the City and the teams negotiated leases for the stadiums. The
responsibility of negotiating the stadiums' leases belonged to the Pub-
lic Auditorium Authority of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, now
known as The Sports and Exhibition Authority (the "Authority").' 3
The Authority's poor negotiating position allowed the Pirates and
Steelers to receive favorable leases. The leases meant that teams
4. The Pittsburgh Penguins pursuit of a new arena will not be included in the same discussion
as the Pirates and Steelers pushes for new stadiums because the Penguins' attempt for a new
arena came nearly ten years later. Additionally, as is discussed infra, the Penguins' arena funding
came from different sources than the Pirates and Steelers' stadiums.
5. See Pittsburgh Pirates, History of the Pittsburgh Pirates, http://pittsburgh.pirates.mlb.com/
pit/history/index.jsp (click on hyper link Pirates Timeline) (last visited September 19, 2010)
[hereinafter Pirates' History]; Pittsburgh Steelers, History of the Pittsburgh Steelers, http://news.
steelers.com/MediaContent/2007/08/22/05/Steelers History_80311.pdf (last visited September 19,
2010) [hereinafter Steelers' History].
6. Steelers' History, supra note 5 (In 1964 the Steelers moved into Pitt Stadium, which was the
home of the University of Pittsburgh's football team).
7. Three Rivers Stadium, Ballparks of Baseball , available at http://www.ballparksofbaseball.
com/past/Three%20Rivers%2OStadium.htm (last visited on September 19, 2010).
8. Id.
9. Steve Gietschier, Three Rivers Stadium, http://www.sportingnews.com/archives/threerivers/
facts.html (last visited on March 3, 2010) (the Steelers' hosted the American Football League
Conference game in 1972, 1976, 1979, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1998).
10. Id. (the Pirates won the World Series in 1971 and 1979).
11. Don Banks, A Fond Farewell. Svow-rs lii usr., December 13, 2000, http://sportsillustrated.
cnn.com/inside-game/don-banks/news/2000/12/13/banksinsider decl3/.
12. Id.
13. The Sports and Exhibition Act, 16 PA CONS. STAT. § 5505-A(a) (2009).
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would not fully reimburse the public's contribution of roughly $350
million.
The public trust doctrine could provide the public with a method to
ensure repayment of the public's contribution to stadium's construc-
tion funds. Under the public trust doctrine, the Authority owed fiduci-
ary dutiesl 4 to the public. One of the Authority's fiduciary duties was
to negotiate leases that would lead to the full reimbursement of pub-
lic's contribution to the stadiums' construction cots. The Authority
breached its duties to the public when the leases failed to ensure that
the teams pay back the public's contribution. When a public trust
breaches its fiduciary duties, the Attorney General can seek remedies.
The Attorney General could request or force the Authority to renego-
tiate the terms of the leases. This argument is strained by several
problems but the public needs a method to ensure that multi-million
dollar sport franchises repay the public's contribution to stadium con-
struction costs. If the public lacks an option to ensure repayment of
public subsidies, then sports franchises will not continue to get pub-
licly financed stadiums.
II. BACKGROUND
When Three Rivers opened in 1970, it became one of the temples of
American sports. During its first decade of existence, the Pirates and
Steelers won a total of six World Championships, 5 including 1979
when both won World Championships. Starting in the early 1990s, the
franchises went in opposite directions' 6 with only Three Rivers bind-
ing them. Three Rivers cost $55 million to build in the late-1960s.17
The City of Pittsburgh owned the stadium because a majority of the
construction funds came from public money.'8 Over time the stadium
underwent minor renovations, but the City failed to address the sta-
14. BI.ACK'S LAw DIcrlONARY 545 (8th ed. 2007) (defines a fiduciary duty as, "A duty of
utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary to the beneficiary to the
beneficiary; a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person
and in the best interests of the other person").
15. See Steelers' History, supra note 5 (The Steelers won in 1974, 1975, 1978 and 1979); Pirates'
History, supra note 5 (click on hyper link results, then click on the postseason link) (The Pirates
won in 1971 and 1979).
16. Contra Pirates' History, supra note 5 (click on hyperlink results, then click on the post-
season hyperlink) (the Pirates made the playoffs three times, 1990, 1991 and 1992 and had only
seven winning seasons) with Steelers' History, supra note 6 (the Steelers won the two Super
Bowls, 2006 and 2009, played in the 1995 Super Bowl, made the playoffs sixteen times and had
nineteen winning seasons).
17. Three Rivers Stadium, supra note 7.
18. Three Rivers Stadium, http://www.ballparks.com/baseball/national/3river.htm (last visited
on March 3, 2010).
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dium's worsening condition.19 By the mid-1990s, the condition of
Three Rivers appeared dire because of new stadiums opening in
Cleveland and Baltimore. 20
In 1996, Major League Baseball (MLB) approved the sale of the
Pirates but with a caveat that the Pirates move into a new stadium. 2 1
MLB stated that the Pirates needed a new stadium by 2001 and a plan
needed to be in place within two years. 22 It was also during this time
period that both the Pirates and Steelers started serious campaigns for
new stadiums. The teams cited the success of other new stadiums as
rationales for new stadiums. 23 Additionally, the teams wanted sepa-
rate stadiums, which complicated the situation.24
While the sale of the Pirates created a problem for the City and
team, it solved another situation for the City and the Pirates. Since
the 1980s, the Pirates future in Pittsburgh remained in question.25 The
possibility of losing the Pirates brought turmoil to the city. 2 6 Along
with being the longest established professional sports team in Pitts-
burgh, the Pirates are also one of the oldest franchises in baseball.27
The Pirates began playing baseball in Pittsburgh in 1887 and during its
123 year history, won five World Series titles.28 Despite their success
19. Three Rivers Stadium, supra note 7 (the type of turf used on the field was changed, the
outfield fences were moved closer, and other basic maintenance was done on the stadium).
20. Smith, supra note 2, at 46 (Jacobs Field in Cleveland and Camden Yards in Baltimore
became the envy of every other owner in professional sports).
21. Robert Dvorchak, PNC Park: The Political Struggle Over Financing PNC Park Went Into
Extra Innings, Pitt. Post-Gaz., April 15, 2001, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pirates/
20010415pncbuildtext9.asp.
22. How They Scored: A Timeline, Pitt. Post-Gaz., April 7, 2009, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/regionstate/I 9990407timelinepnc9.asp.
23. Banks, supra note 11.
24. Ron Cook, Plan B Flawed, Options is Worse, Pri-is. PosT-GAz., June 22, 1998, http://
www.post-gazette.com/sports -headlines/1 9980622bcook3.asp (originally, the Pirates were going
to build a new stadium and the Steelers were going to remodel Three Rivers Stadium and con-
tinue to play there).
25. Kevin Clark Forsythe, The Stadium Game Pittsburgh Style: Observations on the Latest
Round of Publically Financed Sport Stadia in Steel Town, U.S.A.; And Comparisons with 29
Other Major League Teams, 10 MARo. SPORTs L.J. 237, 238-9 (2002).
26. Dvorchak, supra note 21.
27. Pirates' History, supra note 5.
28. Pirates' History, supra note 5; It should be noted that Major League Baseball (MLB)
considers the Pirates first year to be 1882. MLB, Team Histories, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/
history/mlb.history-teams.jsp (last visited September 15, 2009). MLB most likely considers this
the Pirates founding date because that is when the current Pirates team started playing but the
team entered the National League in 1987. Albrecht Powell, History of Pittsburgh Pirates Base-
ball, Anourr.com, http://pittsburgh.about.com/od/pirates/a/history.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2009). Taking MLB official definition the Pirates would be the tied for the oldest team in base-
ball with the Cincinatti Reds and the St. Louis Cardinals. Supra.
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on the field, the Pirates had serious financial issues. 29 The financial
success of the Steelers furthered the belief that Pittsburgh was a foot-
ball city.30 In 1990, the Pirates drew its best attendance, with an aver-
age of 25,308 fans per game, 31 which amounted to little more than half
of Three Rivers' baseball capacity. 32 Several ideas existed to keep the
Pirates in Pittsburgh. These ideas included an abortive attempt to sell
Three Rivers to an un-named New York investor in 1985; a public-
private initiative of institutional and corporate investors to buy the
Pirates in 1986; and a $20 million loan to the Pirates from the city,
which remains unpaid.33 In the early 1990s, the city proposed a new
stadium for the Pirates but a plan never fully materialized due to a
lack of funds and uncertainty about the Pirates' future.34
While the Pirates proposed stadium failed, other cities saw the
opening of new publically funded stadiums.35 Teams and cities wanted
stadiums, which from the first glance; a fan could identify the sta-
dium's city and team. 36 In the 1960s and 1970s, cities built stadiums for
functionality, which caused stadiums to look similar in different cit-
ies.37 Riverfront Stadium in Cincinnati, Three Rivers Stadium in Pitts-
burgh and Veterans Stadium in Philadelphia all looked the same.38
Also, the bowl shape of these stadiums created perfect venues for
football but made bad venues for baseball. 39 Often the city's baseball
team started the push for a new stadium. 40 An original idea proposed
the construction of a new stadium for the Pirates and the renovation
29. Dvorchak, supra note 21.
30. Banks, supra note 11.
31. Pittsburgh Pirates Attendance, Stadiums and Park Factors, BASEBi3ALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/PIT/attend.shtml (The only time the Pirates drew
more than 25,308 fans was in 2001, the year PNC Park opened) (last visited September 19, 2010).
32. Three Rivers Stadium, supra note 7 (the Pirates put covers over the upper deck of the
stadium to try to improve the baseball feeling of the stadium. This meant that the capacity for
baseball was a little less than 48,000).
33. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 239.
34. Dvorchak, supra note 21.
35. Martin J. Greenberg, Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999, 10 MARo
SPORTs L.J. 383, 385-6 (2000) (Greenberg's tables show how the public has born the majority of
the stadium costs during the 1990s).
36. John Dovonan, Out With the Old, Si'owrs ILiius'r., April 12, 2004, available at http://sport-
sillustrated.cnn.com/2004/writers/john-donovan/04/12/payoff.pitch/index.html.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Tim Chapin, The Political Economy of Sports Facility Location: An End-of-the-Cen-
tury Review and Assessment, 10 MARO. SPORTS L.J. 361 (200)(this article explains how teams
have favored moving from the suburbs back into urban settings and how this trend is especially
strong with baseball teams that want more traditional stadiums).
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of Three Rivers for the Steelers. This plan fell through when the
Steelers decided they wanted a new stadium. 41
Next, the teams cited new stadiums creating a better economy for
both the City and themselves. The teams and the governments prom-
ised new jobs, new businesses and a better quality of life for citizens.4 2
The City, Commonwealth, Pirates and Steelers advocated these fac-
tors as reasons why new stadiums and the use of public funds bene-
fited the public. 4 3 Additionally, the teams stated that new stadiums
would lead to higher profits, which would allow the teams to be more
competitive.4 4 The Pirates' owners stated this as a pivotal reason why
they needed a new stadium. 4 5 The Steelers' owner claimed that possi-
ble additional revenue from a new stadium would allow them to keep
high price players and sign expensive free agents. 4 6 Eventually, the
time came for the City and the Commonwealth to make a decision on
new stadiums.
In November 1997, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania allowed
a ballot initiative in eleven southwestern Pennsylvania counties. 47 If
passed, the initiative implemented an additional 0.5% sales tax,4 8
which would be used to fund two new stadiums. While this plan was
formally named the "Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Renais-
sance Initiative," 4 9 its opponents called it the "Stadium Tax."5 0 Advo-
cates spent millions of dollars in support or opposition of the plan,
including a large sum by outside interests.51 The public voted resound-
ingly against the plan, with some outside countries voting eight to one
against.52
Seven days after the initial plan failed, state and local leaders for-
mulated a new plan; cleverly known as Plan B.5 3 Plan B involved mas-
sive state subsidies, along with existing local sales and hotel taxes to
help fund two new stadiums. 5 4 The original estimates predicted state
41. Cook, supra note 24.
42. Smith, supra note 2, at 45.
43. Dvorvack, supra note 21.
44. David Dvorvack, A TD for Plan B. Prrr. Posr-GAz., June 21, 1998, available at http://
www.post-gazette.com/regionstate/19 980621 bplanb5.asp.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 237.
48. Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Renaissance initiative, 16 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3000.3054 (Supp. 1998).
49. See Id. § 3000.3054(c)
50. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 237.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. How They Scored: A Timeline, supra note 22.
54. Dvorvack, supra note 44.
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subsidies of roughly $75 million per stadium. 5 After the public, news-
papers and the Pennsylvania General Assembly vigorously debate
Plan B, it passed with ease in February 1999.56 Local newspapers and
pundits considered the passage of Plan B a disgrace, with Allegheny
County Commissioner Larry Dunn even calling it Scam B. 57 The sup-
porters of Plan B, hailed it as a success because it involved no new
taxes. Allegheny County Commission Bob Cranmer said, "This deal
will be a hallmark for other cities because we did it with no new taxes.
We did an outstanding job."58
With a financing plan in place, the City and the teams started nego-
tiating the leases. To oversee the construction of the stadiums and to
negotiate the leases the Pennsylvania General Assembly created the
Authority.59 The city officials raised concerns about cost overruns,
rent, non-game day revenues and parking revenues; they expected the
Authority to resolve these concerns.60
The finalized leases contained terms favorable to the teams. The
Authority released the Pirates 29.5 year lease first. Under the lease
the Pirates contributed roughly $40 million for construction costs. 6 1
This money came from multiple sources but only $4 million came up
front.62 The lease allocated the other $36 million over the course of
the lease including $1.5 million a year from a 5% ticket surcharge and
$1.4 million from naming rights proceeds. 63 The City and Common-
wealth contributed the other $160 million in construction costs. 6 4 The
Pirates promised to pay any cost overruns on the stadium.65
Under the lease, the Pirates pay $100,000 a year in rent.6 6 At the
time, the Pirates' lease was the lowest in the major leagues by roughly
$150,000.67 The Pirates keep all the profits from concessions, adver-
tisements and restaurants inside the stadium. 68 The Authority, City
and Commonwealth can schedule a total of five events a year, which
55. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 238
56. Id.
57. Dvorvack, supra note 44.
58. Cook, supra note 24.
59. 15 PA CONS. STAT. § 5505-A.
60. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 240 (City councilman, Dan Cohen, who also sat on the Author-
ity's board raised these concerns).
61. Id. at appendix.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 246 (Oakland was the next lowest at $250,000).
68. Id.
692010]
70 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
the Authority keeps all revenues earned. 69 The public also pays for all
of the capital improvements, which need to be made to the stadium,
except for ticket surcharge proceeds beyond $1.5 million.70
The Steelers' lease slightly benefited the public more than the Pi-
rates' lease because of the franchises' stronger financial situation. The
lease required the Steelers to pay $60 million in construction costs.7 1
The Steelers paid $6 million at the start,72 with the rest paid after the
team sold club seats and seat licenses.73 The lease also required the
Steelers to pay $1.4 million a year from ticket sale taxes to the Au-
thority to pay for construction costs. The public contributed approxi-
mately $160 million.74
The Steelers pay a rent of $250,000 per season for 29.5 years.75 The
Steelers keep all the profits made from naming rights, concessions,
novelties sold and in-stadium advertising.76 However, the public keeps
all the profits from advertisements placed on a marquis, which sits
outside the stadium.77 The Steelers get the proceeds from sport events
held in the stadium.78 This includes the revenue from an agreement
with the University of Pittsburgh ("Pitt"), which allows Pitt to use the
stadium for its own football team.79 The Steelers also keeps 85% of
the profits made from non-football events, with the public keeping the
rest.8 As with the Pirates, the Authority, City and Commonwealth get
to schedule five events total a year at Heinz Field and keep the
profits.81
These leases have their similarities but they also have their differ-
ences. The Steelers contributed more money to the construction costs
because of its better financial position and the fact that the Steelers
play fewer home games than the Pirates.82 On the other hand, the
Pirates' financial situation limited its initial contribution.83 The City
hoped a new stadium would lead to a renewal in the Pirates' winning
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Cook, supra note 24.
83. Id.
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ways, which would improve the teams' financial position.84 In 2009,
the Pirates became arguably professional sports worst franchise, when
it recorded a seventeenth consecutive losing season.85
The Authority, which negotiated the leases, acts as an interesting
entity, due to its quasi-governmental status. The Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly created the Authority, and the Mayor of Pittsburgh ap-
points its board of directors.8 6 The Authority acts as an agent of the
government87 and has the power of a government body.88 On the
other hand, it can be sued as a separate entity and can incur debts
separate from the government.89 The exemption from real estate taxes
and other forms of taxes is the Authority's key governmental charac-
teristic.90 The Authority and the property it owns are exempt from
real estate taxes, 91 to Allegheny County, the City and the Pittsburgh
School District.92 Since the Authority owns some of the most expen-
sive pieces of property in Pittsburgh, being tax exempt deprives the
City of crucial tax revenues. 93 The fact that a quasi-governmental ac-
tor owns the stadiums creates the basis of the public trust doctrine.
III. THE ISSUE FOR THE PUBLIC
The lease terms for the Pirates and Steelers' new stadiums strongly
favored the teams and allowed them to walk away with almost $350
million of public funds. Since the opening of the stadiums, the Com-
monwealth experienced lower revenues due to the downturn in the
local economy. 9 4 During these tough times, the Commonwealth at-
84. Id.
85. Pat Lackey, Pirates Clinch Record 17th Consecutive Losing Season, MLBFANIHOUSE.COM,
Sept. 7, 2009, http://mlb.fanhouse.com/2009/09/07/pirates-clinch-record-17th-consecutive-losing-
season/.
86. 16 PA CONS. STAT. § 5508-A(a)(2).
87. Id. § 5505-A(a).
88. The Authority has power of eminent domain, to sell bonds, and other governmental pow-
ers. See Id. § 5505-A(b)(1)-(15).
89. Id. § 5505-A(c).
90. Id. § 5516-A.
91. Id.
92. Real estate taxes are crucial because revenues raised from real estate taxes are used to pay
for education expenses in the school district where the taxes are raised. Pittsburgh school district
is losing a key source of funds because there are no real estate taxes on PNC Park, Heinz Field,
the soon to be Penguins new Arena and the David Lawrence Convention Center. See 24 PA.
CONS. STAT. S. 6-655.1 (2009).
93. Jake Haulk and Eric Montarti, Flaggin the Black and Gold, ALLEGHENY INST. FOR PUB.
Poi'v, Nov. 4, 2007, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/colum-
nists/guests/s 536177.html (It is estimated that Heinz Field, PNC Park and the Penguins' soon to
be constructed Arena would pay roughly $21,000,000 in real estate taxes).
94. Tom Barnes, State's Budget Problems May Force Tax Hike, Prrr. Posvr-GAz., Jan. 28, 2009,
available at http://www.postgazette.com/pg/09028/944939-454.stm (As of February 2009, the pro-
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tempted to exercise smart fiscal policy to ensure a balanced budget.95
The strain on the budget means higher taxes for the citizens of Penn-
sylvania, 96 while the Pirates and Steelers get publicly financed
stadiums.
While the Commonwealth struggled financially, the City and people
of Pittsburgh also fell on hard times.9 7 The steel and coal industries
have long left the City. However, the economy of Pittsburgh is better
than other areas of Pennsylvania98 because of the success of the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Medical Center, which is expanding and consid-
ered one of the best medical institutions in the world.99
Even in financially troubled times, the Steelers draw sell out
crowds.100 Most likely fans and the general public care little about the
Steelers lack of enthusiasm to repay the public's money.t 0' The Pi-
rates are another story. Robert Dvorchak, of the Pittsburgh Post-Ga-
zette, said about the elected officials, who support the building of PNC
Park, that "if the ball park is a hit and the Pirates succeed and baseball
gets its house in order, the complainers (those who opposed the use of
public funds) will be silenced. If it isn't voters likely will forget every-
ject fiscal budget for 2010, would be 2.8 billion dollars in deficit. This was caused by the fact that
the government was bringing record lows in revenue while costs were constantly rising).
95. See P.A. CONs r. art. VIII, § 12. (Pennsylvania like many states has a balanced budget law,
which states that the Commonwealth cannot run budget deficits, like the federal government
can).
96. Barnes, supra note 94.
97. Craig Smith, Tax Revenue Plunge Chokes Funding, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Prrr.
TRIB.-REv., November 9, 2008, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/
cityregion/s 597577.htmi.
98. Pennsylvania's Dept. of Labor, Pennsylvania Workforce Statistics, http://www.paworkstats.
state.pa.us/ (last visited February 20, 2009) (this map shows that the greater Pittsburgh area's
unemployment rate is better than most of the Commonwealth's and sits at the national average).
99. See UMPC, Pittsburgh Region's Largest Employer, Laying Off 500, WTAV, October 23,
2008, available at http://www.thepittsburghchannel.com/money/17784086/detail.html (even
though UPMC was laying off 500, they still plan on adding 3000 jobs in the near future).
100. NFL Football Attendance, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nfl/attendance (select year from
drop down menu)(last visited September 19, 2010) (these charts so the Steelers draw over 99%
capacity for home games.).
101. In the summer of 2008, there was a rumor that the Steelers' long time owners, the
Rooney family, may sell the team and several interested buyers would move the team from the
Pittsburgh area. During this period, the City officials stated that if the Steelers left, the new
owner would need to pay the public's contribution to the stadium. Team Sale Would Trigger
Review of Public Stadium Funding, ESPN, July 16, 2008, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/
nfl/news/story?id=3491526.
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thing but their grudges."102 However, the Pirates remain a failure on
the field and in drawing fans.10 3
While the Pirates experience poor attendance, many consider PNC
Park to be a success. ESPN and Sports Illustrated rate PNC Park in
the top three stadiums in professional baseball.104 However, the Pi-
rates' lack of competitiveness means that few fans attend games and
drove attendance below the level it was before PNC Park opened. 05
Additionally, low attendance drives down the revenue collected
through the ticket surcharge and amusement taxes.
The inefficiencies of the Pirates' and Steelers' leases became clear
in September of 2007 with the release of the Pittsburgh Penguins, the
City's National Hockey League franchise, lease. The Penguins, like
the Pirates, used threats of leaving the City to get a new arena.106
Eventually, the City and Commonwealth desperate to keep the team
authorized the construction of a new arena with the use of public
funds. 107 The new arena opened in the fall of 2010 across the street
from the Penguin's current venue, the Mellon Arena. 08 The Penguins'
lease is much different than the Pirates and Steelers' leases. The Pen-
guins will pay a base rent of $3.6 million.109 The public bears a lower
burden with the construction of the Penguins' arena because gambling
revenues will pay for roughly a third of the construction cost." 0 The
102. Dvorchak, supra note 21 (It would be noted, that the two city councilman, who pushed
Pittsburgh's part of the public financing through, lost their seats. Mayor Tom Murphy survived a
tough challenge in the primaries and general election. Many considered him to be the one who
kept the Pirates in Pittsburgh).
103. See Pittsburgh Pirates Attendance, Stadium and Park Factors, supra note 32; supra note
104. See MLB Park Rankings, SPowrs I LUST., available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
baseball/mlb/specials/fansurvey/2008/index.html?eref=T (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (Sports Il-
lustrated ranked PNC Park third in its 2008 evaluation of Major League Baseball stadiums); Jim
Caple, Pittsburgh's Gem Rates the Best, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/page2/s/ballparks/
pncpark.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (in 2006, ESPN ranked PNC Park as the top stadium in
Major League Baseball).
105. See Pittsburgh Pirates Attendance, Stadium and Park Factors, supra note 31.
106. See Penguins to Aggressively Explore Relocation, ESPN, Mar. 6, 2007, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2788701; Jeremy Boren & Rob Rossi, Mario: We Never
Planned to Leave Pittsburgh, Prrr. TRm.-Ri v., Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.pittsbur-
ghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_582923.htmi (Penguins' owner Mario Lexiuex used threats of leav-
ing to get a new stadium, even though he had no intention of leaving Pittsburgh).
107. Pens Reached Agreement To Stay In Pittsburgh, ESPN, March 14, 2007, http://
sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=279655 2 .
108. See New Multi-Purpose Arena Development, Sports and Exhibition Authority of Pitts-
burgh, http://www.pgh-sea.com/NewMultiUseArena.htm (Last visited September 19, 2010).
109. Sports and Exhibition Authority, Pittsburgh Arena Memorandum of Understanding,
http://www.pgh-sea.com/NewMultiUseArena.htm (click on Memorandum of Understanding)
(last accessed March 3, 2009).
110. Jake Haulk, Taxpayers Backstop Casino Pledge to Penguins Arena, AiLLiCiNY INST.
FOR PuB. PoL'Y, Vol 8: No 54.(August 21, 2009).
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City and Commonwealth estimate that the Penguins' rent and contri-
butions from gambling revenues will pay roughly two-thirds of the to-
tal costs of the arena.'II This leaves the public responsible for only a
third of the cost, which pales in comparison to the roughly three-
fourths of the costs of the Pirates and Steelers' stadiums.
The people of the City and the whole Commonwealth saw their
elected officials spend roughly $350 million to build two new stadiums.
Then the Authority negotiated two leases, which ensured that the bur-
den to pay for the stadiums fell on the public instead of the teams.
This situation happened all over the United States since 1990, leaving
the public bearing a majority of stadium construction expenses. 1 12 The
public needs a method to change the leases' terms. The leases should
reflect the interests that best serve the public, which paid for the stadi-
ums, as well as the tenants. The public trust doctrine may give the
City, the Commonwealth, along with cities and states across the coun-
try a way out of perverse leases.
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: A SOLUTION?
The public trust doctrine could be invoked to force the Authority to
change the terms of the leases. A "public trust comprises of the trust
res, property which is subject matter of the trust; a trustee who holds
legal title to the res; and a beneficiary or beneficiaries, for whose ben-
efit the res is held, and who have equitable rights in the res."113 The
Commonwealth's public trust doctrine exists both at common law and
as a constitutional amendment. At common law, the public trust doc-
trine primarily protected navigable waterways. 114 In 1971 the Com-
monwealth's Constitution was amended to include the public trust
doctrine,1' 5 in an attempt to help the Commonwealth better protect
111. Id.
112. Greenberg, supra note 35, at 385-6 (since 1990, thirty-seven new stadiums or arena's,
with $6,500,000,000 in construction costs, have opened. The public has contributed most of the
construction cost, while the teams donate very little. The two extremes are the Columbus Blue
Jackets of the NHL, who received no public money and the Cincinnati Bengals of the NFL,
whose new stadium was fully financed by public money).
113. Richard C. Lewis, The Pennsylvania Public Trust Doctrine: Its Use as a Restraint on Gov-
ernment, 13 Duo. L. Rrzv. 551, 552 (1971)(citing I G.G. Boonar AN) G.T. BOGERT, The iLAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRISTEEs § 1 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATFMENT (SEcoNo) or, TRusTs § 2(h) (1959)).
114. Id. at 552.
115. P.A. CONsr. art I § 27. Article 1: Declaration of Rights
That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recog-
nized and unalterably established, WE DECLARE THAT- § 27: Natural resources and the pub-
lic estate. The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources
are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
natural resources.'16 The public trust doctrine may have been created
as a general restraint on the power of government, protecting the pub-
lic from the abuses of the Commonwealth. The amendment "confers
certain enumerated rights upon the people . . . and imposes upon the
executive branch a fiduciary obligation to protect and enforce these
rights."117
Additionally, the public trust doctrine could be considered to be a
subset of the charitable trust doctrine.118 The charitable trust doctrine
usually governs charities, museums and educational institutions.'19
These institutions hold res for the public enjoyment, education, char-
ity or public purpose.120 Under the public trust doctrine, the govern-
ment or charitable institutions are the fiduciary and the public is the
beneficiary. 121 The types of fiduciary duties depend upon the type of
arrangement and the relationships between the trust and the public.122
Standing to file a law suit against a public trusts can be a complex
issue. If the public trust is governed by the same rules as a charitable
trust then the Attorney General can file suit on behalf of the public
under the doctrine of parens patriae.123 The parens patriae doctrine
states, "a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of
a citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disabil-
ity to prosecute the suit." 1 2 4 The Attorney General holds this power
because the Attorney General's purpose is to protect the public from
harm. 125 However, the Attorney General lacks the capacity to bring
suit in an environmental trust because the Attorney General is the
counsel for all government run trusts;126 therefore, a member of the
tax paying public has standing.127
Standing will be complex when dealing with the Authority. While
the Authority can be sued, the extent of the suits is mainly contractual
in nature. The Attorney General would be in the best position to file
these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
people.
116. Lewis, supra note 113, at 551.
117. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Towers, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 596 (Pa.
1973) (Jones, J. dissenting).
118. Lewis, supra note 113, at 572.
119. 14 C.J.S. CHARITIES § 2 (2010)
120. Ri-STATEMIWr (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959). .
121. 14 C.J.S. Charities § 2 (2010)
122. Id.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TiHE LAW OF TRzusis § 391 (1959).
124. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, 1144 (8th ed. 2007).
125. 7 AM. JUR. 2d., Attorney General § 6.
126. Lewis, supra note 113, at 572.
127. Id. at 568-9.
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suit for a violation of fiduciary duties. The Authority is a quasi-gov-
ernmental entity, so the Attorney General is not its counsel. On the
other hand, the Authority holds the stadiums in trust for the public
benefit, making it similar to a charitable trust. Therefore, the Author-
ity is a hybrid between a public trust and a governmental body; hence,
the Attorney General should purse a claim if the Authority breached
its duties to the public.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Does a Public Trust Exist?
If the public trust doctrine applies, then the stadiums are the res
held by the Authority for the benefit of the public. Hence, the Author-
ity will be the trustee, while the public will be the beneficiary. The
public trust doctrine applies if stadiums' purpose is to benefit the pub-
lic and the Authority holds the stadiums in trust for that purpose.
However, for a public trust to exist, the trustee must make a "manifes-
tation of an intention to create the [public trust]."128
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision of Martin v. City of
Philadelphial29Supports the applications of the public trust doctrine
because it allows for athletic stadiums to be built with public funds. 130
William Martin filed a suit to stop the use of public funds for construc-
tion of a new stadium in Philadelphia during the 1960s.131 The suit
claimed that the public funding of stadiums violated the public pur-
pose clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 1 3 2 The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania said that the use of public funds for athletic stadiums
was permissible under the public purpose clause:
A sports is for the recreation of the public and is hence for public
purpose; for public projects are not confined to providing only the
bare bones of municipal life, such as police protection, streets, sewers,
light and water; they may provide gardens, parks, monuments, foun-
tains, libraries, museums, and 'Generally speaking, anything calcu-
lated to promote the education, the recreation, and pleasure of the
public.133
The Pennsylvania courts dismissed all the suits filed challenging the
recent new stadiums in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia based upon the
128. ReSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ril LAw oF TRUSTS § 351 (1959).
129. Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894 (Pa. 1966).
130. Id. at 989-9.
131. Id. at 894.
132. Id. at 895.
133. Id. at 896 (citing Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 171 N.E. 606, 606 (Ohio Ct. App 1930)).
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cases from the 1960s,134 like the Martin decision.13 5 Under the defini-
tion used by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the stadiums provide
enjoyment to the public, just as a state park provides enjoyment to the
public. The Commonwealth holds the state park in trust for the peo-
ple; similarly, the Authority holds the stadiums in trust for the people.
Since it is well established that a state park is a public or charitable
trust, the Authority should also be considered a public trust.
The Authority could argue that it fulfilled its fiduciary duty when it
negotiated the leases because it did the best it could based upon its
weak negotiating position. 36 The City started to build two state-of-
the-art stadiums and the stadiums needed tenants. Also, sport teams
hold cities prisoner in order to get new venues and favorable lease
conditions for the venues. 3 7 The Authority and the City attempted to
negotiate leases, which terms fell into the median of leases for other
major franchises in baseball and football.' 38 However, the Authority
coward in face of the teams' demands and allowed them to walk away
with $350 million in public funds.
Also, the Authority's originating statute leads to the conclusion that
the Authority should be considered a public trust. The act that cre-
ated the Authority stated that "the purpose and interest of this [act]
being to benefit the people of the Commonwealth by, among other
things, increasing their commerce and prosperity and promoting their
educational, cultural, physical, civic, social and moral welfare."' 3 9 The
legislature wanted the Authority to promote a public benefit and the
means mentioned by the legislation appear similar to those associated
with a public or charitable trust. Therefore, the Authority's enabling
act indicates that its purpose is to act like a public trust.
According to John K. Harris, Jr., teams, themselves, are public trust
and the owners owe fiduciary duties to the public.14 0 During the late-
134. See Michael J. Cremonese, Building New Stadiums With Your Money Whether You Like
It Or Not: The Pennsylvania Constitution Does Not Prohibit The Use Of Public Funds To Con-
struct New Stadiums, 37 Duo. L. REv. 423 (1999) (the article explains the evolution of constitu-
tionality of the public funding of sport stadiums and concludes that the Pennsylvania
Constitution does not prohibit the use of public funds).
135. Id.
136. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 246-7.
137. See Brent Bordson, Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being Held Hostage By
Professional Sports Team Owners, 21 HAMINE L. REV. 505 (1998) (the article explains the rela-
tionship between host cities and teams and how teams are able to get new stadiums).
138. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 240.
139. 16 PA. Cons. Stat. § 5505-A(a).
140. See John K. Harris, Jr. Fiduciary Duties Professional Team Sports Franchises Owners, 2
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 255 (1992)(Mr. Harris was a partner at the law firm of Shutts
and Bowen in Miami, Florida at the time the article was published).
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1980s and early-1990s, baseball experienced troubled times, which
culminated in the 1994 work stoppage. The period saw teams threaten
to leave their long time home cities because of conflicts with cities. For
instance the Chicago White Sox, which had been in Chicago since
1901, threatened to leave for St. Petersburg, Florida. 14 1 Other teams
traded or cut a majority of their talent. For example, the media heav-
ily criticized the San Diego Padres (Padres) for trading or cutting a
majority of its players to save on payroll.142 In some games, the Padres
starting lineup's salary was equal to the salary of one player on the
opposing team.143 Situations like the Padres angered the public and
caused at least two sports scholars to argue that the nature of profes-
sional sports teams made them public trusts.144 In order to fulfill their
fiduciary duties the owners would have to field or attempt to field
competitive teams.145 The fact that teams play in publicly financed
stadiums formed a crucial part of the public trust reasoning. 146
This public economic investment may not be excessive or unwar-
ranted. But understanding its magnitude is critical to any evaluation of
the public's stake in sports franchises. The investment is real and so
are the feelings that the investment entitles the public to beneficial
ownership. As the public's economic partnership with owners grows,
the manner in which owners react becomes more important. 147
The City, Commonwealth, Pirates and Steelers' argument that the
stadiums would improve the quality of life in the area helps lay the
foundation for the public trust doctrine. Some businesses moved into
that area, some found success and others failed.148 In the period after
PNC Park opened, some of the neighboring restaurants asked the Pi-
rates to move games to an early time.149 The restaurants' owners
hoped that an early start time for the baseball games would create a
diner rush.15 0 The whole economy of the City lacked robustness over
the past ten years, including the area around the stadiums.' 5' The
141. Id. at 257-8.
142. L. Patrick Auld, Ownership Control Over Professional Sports Teams' Payrolls: Could An-
yone Have Stopped Tom Werner From Dismantling the San Diego Padres? 12 U. MIAMi ENT. &
Si'owrs L. REv. 129, 131 (1994).
143. Id.
144. Auld, supra note 142, at 140-2; Harris, supra note 140, at 256.
145. Auld, supra note 142, at 140.; Harris, supra note 140, at 271-3.
146. Harris, supra note 140, at 257-8.
147. Id. at 258.
148. KEVIN J. Di'ILANY AND RICK ECKSTEIN, PuntIC DoLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS, 159
(Rudgers Uni. Press, 2003).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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promise of an economic boost and better conditions in the City indi-
cates that one of the stadium's purposes was to improve the life of the
public. The goal of improving the quality of life for city residents
clearly falls within the parameters of the public trust doctrine.
Furthermore, strong public policy reasoning exists for the applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine. A complex relationship exists be-
tween communities and teams. In some circumstances, sports teams
identify cities and whole geographical regions.152 The Steelers could
easily be considered the identifying mark of the City, 15 3 just as the
Cubs are associated with Chicago, the Yankees with New York and
the Cowboys with Dallas. These associations lead to cities and com-
munities becoming attached to a team. Losing those teams could be
devastating for the community.154 Government officials live in the
fear of the public outcry if a team leaves a city.155 The communities'
reluctance to lose teams, shifts power to team owners, which allows
them to get favorable conditions for leases, taxes or other wanted
amenities.156 Allowing the use of the public trust doctrine gives cities
and citizens leverage to push back the influence of teams. If a team
wished to change a lease in its favor, it could make threat of leaving
the city, which would force the city to alter the lease. A city should be
allowed the same power to renegotiate leases when circumstances
make it necessary.
The most prominent example of a sports team leaving its host city
over a lease/stadium conflict is the Oakland Raiders. The Raiders tur-
bulent relationship with Oakland started in the 1950s, when it used
threats of leaving to get Frank Yauell Field build.157 Then in the 1960s
the Raiders helped force the construction of Oakland-Alameda Coli-
seum (Coliseum). 58 Oakland owned and ran the Coliseum.159 Short
leases existed between Oakland and the Raiders, which allowed for
152. Harris, supra note 138, at 255.
153. See Dvorchak, supra note 21 (former Pittsburgh Mayor Tom Murphy is on record stating
that he believes that the Pirates' are the brand name of Pittsburgh and that is why he fought so
hard to keep them in the City).
154. Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where
We Are Going, 12 Viiu.. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 205 (2005).
155. See Bordson, supra note 137.
156. Mayer, supra note 154, at 206.
157. Leon F. Mead, II, Raiders: $7.2 Million, City Of Oakland: 0. . . Was That The Final Gun?
A Story Of Intrigue, Suspense And Questionable Reasoning, 9 Loy. ENr. L.J. 401, 402 (1989)
(citing City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, No. 76044 at 2-11, 2 (Cal. Super. Ct filed July 22,
1983)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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frequent negotiations.16 0 Eventually, conflicts arose between the two
parties.161 The biggest conflict revolved around luxury box seating.162
The team refused to pay for the luxury boxes because MLB's Oakland
Athletics also played at the Coliseum.163 Both sides proposed several
plans to resolve the conflicts but no agreement could be met.164 Even-
tually, the Raiders left Oakland for Los Angeles to play at the Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum.16 5 During the Raiders stay in Los Ange-
les, the team negotiated with Oakland about a return.166 As the Raid-
ers tired of Los Angeles, Oakland caved to the Raiders demand.167 In
1995, the Raiders returned to Oakland to a stadium that met its
demands.168
B. Fiduciary Duties Owed To The Public
If the Authority is a public trust, the duties owed to the public can
be complex. For simplicity, only the fiduciary duties involving the
leases will be examined.169
The City and Commonwealth made the Authority the sole party
able to negotiate leases with the teams.170 The Mayor appointed the
members instead of public electing the members.171 The public lacked
the power to ensure or force that the Authority negotiated publicly
beneficial leases. The leases should ensure the eventual reimburse-
ment of the public contribution by the teams. The majority of the
citizens of the City and the Commonwealth disagreed with the use of
public funds to built stadiums for sports teams. 172 Unlike Minnesota
and Montreal, where votes rejected new stadiums:
Our (the City of Pittsburgh and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania)
political leaders didn't have the courage of the voters' convictions.
The voters overwhelmingly rejected the blackmail threat and stood
160. Id. at 403.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 403-4
165. Id. at 405.
166. Oakland Raiders, THE Srowrs ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nfl/
oakland/raiders.html (last visited February 20, 2009).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Other duties would be that the Authority would need to help maintain the stadiums, to
not make self-interested decisions about the use of the stadiums and to schedule the five public
events per stadium.
170. 16 PA CONS. STAT. § 5505-A(a).
171. 16 PA CONS. STAT. § 5508-A(a)(2).
172. Cook, supra note 24 (suggesting that the stadiums are being shoved down the voters
throats).
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their ground, defeating the purposed half percent sale tax in all 11
counties covered by the referendum. There was wisdom and good
sense in that vote. But in the end, the voter's wishes were
ignored.173
The legislature's blind ignorance to the public's wishes entitles the
public to the reimbursement of their contribution.
The nature of sport stadiums creates a unique situation for fiduciary
duties. The public enjoys most public trusts with relative ease. The
public enjoys parks, monuments, fountains and gardens with few
problems. Sports stadiums present a different level of access because
the teams' schedules limit when the public can gain entrance into the
stadiums. While access to a Pirates' games is relatively easy; access to
Steelers' games presents a scarcity issue. Many in the public will
never enjoy a Steelers game at Heinz Field because of the scarcity and
price of the tickets. The high prices and limited number of tickets
make games too expensive for the average citizen to attend. While
market forces keep people out of Steelers' games, they are still bur-
dened with the cost of construction of the stadiums. Also, individuals,
with low incomes, are those least likely to attend sporting events; how-
ever, they also live in the city limits, which means that they are paying
a higher percentage of construction costs than suburbanites, who are
more likely to attend a sporting event. 174 Additionally, baseball and
football games do not appeal to every taxpayer. These taxpayers saw
the Commonwealth give their hard earned tax dollars to an enterprise,
which they have no interest in. The Authority owed a duty to those
who will never enjoy an event in the new stadiums, to ensure that the
teams reimburse the public's contribution.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
The Authority owed a duty to the public to ensure the reimburse-
ment of the public contribution; therefore, the leases should have
been structured to cause reimbursement. If the stadiums do not pro-
duce the external benefits promised by the teams and governments,
then reimbursement of the public's subsidy becomes necessary. The
situation dealt the Authority a bad negotiating position but the Au-
thority bowed to the teams and let the teams dictate the terms of the
leases. The fact that the Authority breached its fiduciary duties bene-
fited the teams and harmed the public.
173. Jake Haulk, Baseball Stadiums: A Story of Three Cities, ALLEIGHENY INST. FOR PuI.
Pot'y, May 31, 2001, http://www.alleghenyinstitute.org/briefs/vollnol2.pdf.
174. Shropshire, supra note 3, at 29.
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The public contributed almost $180 million to the Pirates, after the
team generously raised its initial contribution up to $40 million.175 The
Steelers' contributed nearly sixty million dollars, leaving the public to
pay for $160 million. Hence, the leases allowed the teams to walk
away with nearly $350 million.
Taxes are the only way that the public can regain their contribution.
However, the ticket surcharge tax cannot be taken into account be-
cause the proceeds are used to pay the teams' initial contributions and
any excess will be put into the capital improvement fund. 176 This
leaves the city's amusement tax, which existed at the time of the lease
negotiations. At the time the leases were signed, it was impossible for
anyone to calculate the amount the amusement tax would make due
to the ever changing prices of tickets, and the number of fans going to
games is not a static number either. Also, the amusement tax may fail
to collect extra revenues since attendance for the Pirates and Steelers
is relatively the same as it was at Three Rivers.'77 Additionally, reve-
nues from sales taxes, parking taxes 78 and payroll taxes are insignifi-
cant because they already existed during the negotiations. It would be
hard to determine if the City collected more tax revenues from these
taxes because they are determined by multiple factors, which may not
be connected to the new stadiums.
Also, the City and Commonwealth attempting to recollect the pub-
lic contribution through taxes is pointless because the teams pass the
taxes on to the fans.179 The teams do not take the 5% amusement tax
out of their profits but add the tax to the price of the tickets.180 The
teams are nothing more than a tax collector.'18 Essentially, the fans
are paying twice. Fans' tax dollars paid for roughly three-fourths of
the stadium construction costs. Now when fans attend a game, part of
the ticket's price is used to pay down their contribution to the con-
struction costs. This principle applies to the ticket surcharge tax too.
The leases' tax provisions ensure the burdens of the construction costs
remains with the taxpayers instead of the teams.
175. Cook, supra note 24 (mocking the Pirates willingness to contribute five million more
dollars and suggesting that it would not stop the Pirates' owners from becoming richer).
176. Supra note 63; 74.
177. Contra supra note 31; supra note 100.
178. An increase in parking tax revenues is probably the hardest to determine. The teams
share parking lots, just as they did at Three Rivers Stadium. It could just be assumed that with-
out an increase in attendance, the parking tax revenues will remain about the same.
179. Haulk, supra note 173.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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Additionally, the teams and their owners can prosper without nec-
essarily providing a public benefit. The owners of the teams believe
that the teams are mainly money-making entities; providing the public
with enjoyment is just the means to profits. 182 In both professional
baseball and football, it is not even necessary to make money through
attendance. Profit sharing between the teams ensures that every team
will make some money, even if the team is not individually profita-
ble.'83 Luckily, this is the case for the owners of the Pirates. Although
the Pirates have a low payroll and makes little profits off of attend-
ance, MLB gives the Pirates a share of the leagues' profits every year.
"The ballpark stays beautiful; the payroll stays low; and the revenue-
sharing profits keep rolling in. The Pirates are a boon for their owners.
For their fans, not so much." 184
Still the purpose of sports is entertainment. Without fans going to
the games, professional sports cease to exist. Since teams are depen-
dent upon the fans, they must provide a good product. Part of a good
product is a state-of-the-art stadium. 85 In theory, a better stadium
will draw more fans, who will have a more enjoyable experience. Plus,
some communities take great pride in the stadiums where their teams
play. A prominent example is Yankee Stadium, the home of the New
York Yankees. Yankee fans loved Yankee Stadium and when a new
stadium was built, its design was essentially the same the old stadium,
with a technological upgrade. 186
Finally, not only will the teams never repay the public's contribu-
tion, the promised external benefits are illusory. Board econometrical
studies done in other communities suggest that team's promises of an
economic improvement in the area are fictional. 87 One study suggests
that cities see similar economic conditions and crime rates after new
182. Auld, supra note 142, at 130.
183. Id. at 130-1. (The NFL's profit sharing agreement distributes proceeds from TV contracts
to all 32 teams. Major League Baseball's profit sharing agreement allows the sharing of actual
revenues from profitable teams to unprofitable teams), see James Lincoln Ray, Baseball's Reve-
nue Sharing Problem, http://baseball.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/baseballs-revenue-sharing-prob-
lem (last visited February 20, 2009).
184. Charlie Wilmoth, Five Questions: Pittsburgh Pirates, HARIDAi, TimIS, March, 20, 2006,
http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/article/five-questions-pittsburgh-piratesl/.
185. Greenberg, supra note 35, at 384 (stating how stadiums have become part of a larger and
more technological sophisticated sports market.)
186. Anthony DiComo, New Stadium, Same Old Tradition, MLB, Mar. 30, 2009, http://newy-
ork.yankees.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090330&content-id=4088804&vkey=news-nyy&
fext=.jsp&c id=nyy; The Pirates followed a similar course with PNC Park, since part of the de-
sign was based off Forbes Field. See PNC Park Overview, PIRATES.COM, http://pittsburgh.pi-
rates.mlb.com/pit/ballpark/overview.jsp (last visited March 3, 2010).
187. Smith, supra note 3, 45.
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stadiums open.188 There appears to be no long term improvement in
the condition of the Pittsburgh economy caused by construction of the
new stadiums.18 9 It could take several more years to fully determine
any long term economic impact from the construction of the stadiums.
Even if there is an economic impact, it may be less than the public's
contribution. Over the course of the two leases, the public contributed
roughly $10.2 million a year. 90 In Baltimore, the public saw $3 million
in economic benefits a year from the construction of Camden Yards
but the public contributed roughly $14 million a year.191 If Pittsburgh
does experience a long term economic benefit, it will most likely be
similar to Baltimore. Therefore, any potential economic benefit will
not offset the amount of the public's contribution.
D. Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
The Authority breached its fiduciary duties by failing to negotiate
leases that ensured repayment of the public's contribution, which enti-
tles the public to damages. Under the public trust doctrine, the public
lacks the capacity to seek damages, when the trust breached its duties.
The Attorney General, acting as the protectorate of the public, does
have the power to seek damages. 192 In the stadium situation, one rem-
edy is to change the leases. Repayment of the public funds could be
ensured by altered leases. The leases could be altered in several ways.
Raising rents for the teams, taking more of the funds raised by the
sale of the stadiums' naming rights and raising taxes on the sale of
alcohol will make it easier for the public to recollect their contribu-
tion. Also, if the Authority used some of the gambling revenues from
the new casino in Pittsburgh, the repayment of the public contribution
could be sped up. The use of gambling revenues to help pay back the
public could also make the teams more willing to renegotiate their
leases.
First, teams' rents could be raised. The Steelers could easily afford
to pay a higher rent. Forbes estimates that the Steelers net value is
nearly a billion dollars. 193 The Pirates may be hurt by a higher rent
but the Pirates did little to keep its promises to the public. The Pirates
promised to turn around their losing ways and to field a competitive
188. Id. at 45.
189. DFLANY AN) ECKSTION, supra note 148, 159.
190. $350,000,000 for the two stadiums/ 29.5 years
191. Greenberg, supra note 35, at 388.
192. See supra Section IV.
193. Forbes, NFL Team Valuations, http://www.forbes.com/sports/lists/2008/30/sportsmoney
nflO8_Pittsburgh-Steelers_305046.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (Forbes magazine ranked the
Steelers as the eighteenth wealthiest franchise in professional sports in 2008).
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team but have done neither. Plus, other teams pay two or three times
as much in rent as the Pirates, despite having low revenues.1 9 4 The
Pittsburgh Penguins struggled financially for an extended amount of
time but its rent will be about forty times higher than the Pirates.195
The Pirates could not afford the same type of rent as the Steelers but
enjoy the same benefits as the Steelers so should be forced to pay
similar rent.
While raising the rent is an easy solution, there are several other
changes that could increase the amount and pace of teams' repayment
of the public's contribution. One of those factors concerns the naming
rights to the stadiums. The Jacksonville Jaguars received a publically
financed stadium during the mid-1990s.196 When the team sold the
naming rights to the stadium, the amount was split roughly evenly be-
tween the city and team.197 The Pirates and Steelers took the opposite
approach, claiming the importance of the profits from the sale of the
naming rights to the teams' future success.' 9 8  The teams already
donated a quarter of the funds raised by the sale of the naming rights
to help pay down their debt. PNC pays $1.5 million a season for the
naming rights to the Pirates stadiuml 99; while Heinz pays the Steelers
roughly $2.85 million a year.2 0 0 If the teams kept a quarter of the
funds and gave the rest to the City it would help pay down the public's
contribution to the stadiums.
Also, the teams or City could place an additional surcharge on alco-
hol sold in the stadiums. The City and Commonwealth already levy
multiple taxes against alcohol 201 and another two or three cents would
not hurt sales. Also, alcohol traditionally creates the most revenue of
all concessions.202 Adding an additional tax to the sale the alcohol
194. Forsythe, supra note 35, at 267 (the appendix contains several other leases of Major
League Baseball teams, compare the Kansas City Royals' lease, Colorado Rockies' lease and
Tampa Bay Devil Rays' lease with the Pirates. All those teams have a history of losing but all
pay higher rents).
195. Contra supra note 66; supra note 109.
196. Forsythe, supra note 25, at 254.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Lauren Jaeger, PNC Bank Purchase Naming Rights to Pittsburgh Pirates' New Stadium,
AMUSEMENT BUSINEss, August 17, 1998, http://www.allbusiness.com/services/amusement-recrea-
tion-services/4578408-1.html.
200. Linda Deckard, Heinz Pours Itself Into $57 Million Naming Rights Deal in Pittsburgh,
AMUSIEMENT BUSINEsS, June 25, 2001, http://www.allbusiness.com/services/amusement-recrea-
tion-services/4568098-1.html.
201. See Office of the Treasure of Allegheny County, http://www.alleghenycounty.us/trea-
sure/alcoholtax.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
202. See Bob Curley, Crash, Jury Award Focus Attention on Stadium Alcohol Policies, JOIN
TOEI-HER, June 23, 2006, http://www.jointogether.org/news/features/2006/crash-jury-award-fo-
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could speed up the team's repayment efforts. Collecting money from
the naming rights and alcohol leads to the Authority collecting more
in revenue a year.
Finally, a crucial change occurred in Commonwealth after negotia-
tions and approval of Pirates and Steelers' leases. In 2004, the Com-
monwealth approved slot machine gambling.203 Officials expected to
collect roughly billion dollars a year in extra tax revenue from gam-
bling.204 The extra tax revenue from gambling played a crucial role in
helping pay for the construction of the Penguins new arena.205 Some
of the extra gambling tax revenue, could be shifted to help pay for
some of the debt owed by the Pirates and Steelers. The new casino
sits near the Pirates and Steelers' stadiums on the same street.206 If
data shows that game days bring in extra revenue to the casino, a por-
tion of that could be used to help pay for the stadiums. The casino's
revenue could be particularly higher on Steelers' game days. Steelers'
games bring large numbers of people into the City and the area of the
casino. The Rivers Casino officially opened August 9, 2009.207 Finally,
allowing the use of some of the gambling revenue to pay for part of
the public contribution, the Pirates and Steelers may be more willing
to renegotiate their leases with the Authority.
E. Problems with using the Public Trust Doctrine
While a good argument can be made that a public trust exists be-
tween the Authority and the public; a good argument may not be
enough to entice a court to create a public trust. Courts have been
reluctant to expand the public trust doctrine. The courts generally
confine the public trust doctrine to charitable institutions and environ-
mental concerns.208 The government constantly spends money for the
public benefit without creating a public trust. Therefore, the court
may not believe that just because publicly financed stadiums serve a
public purpose, they are part of a public trust.
cus.html (the article illustrates the problem with how alcohol is distributed at athletic events and
how important the proceeds from the sale of alcohol are for professional teams and colleges).
203. 4 PA CONS. STAT. H§ 1101 et seq.
204. Property Tax Relief in Pennsylvania: Devils in the Details, http://www.issuespa.net/arti-
cles/7114 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009)(gambling tax revenues were suppose to be used for educa-
tion and to lower property taxes).
205. See supra note 109.
206. All three sit on North Shore Drive.
207. See Grand Opening, http://www.theriverscasino.com/grand-opening (last visited March 3,
2010).
208. See Lewis, supra note 113, at 558.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Pitts-
burgh agreed to build two new stadiums for the Pirates and Steelers, it
in essence gave away $350 million in public funds. The government
left the Authority to negotiate the leases with the two teams. These
leases effectively ensured that the teams will never repay the public's
contribution. The public needs a method to ensure that the leases
would lead to reimbursement of public funds. The public trust doc-
trine could be used because the Authority should be considered a fi-
duciary of a public trust and the stadiums are the res of that trust.
Under the public trust doctrine, the Authority would owe a fiduciary
duty to ensure the leases would lead to the reimbursement of the pub-
lic's contribution.
Under the public trust doctrine, when the fiduciary, here the Au-
thority, breaches a duty owed to the beneficiary, here the public, only
the Attorney General can bring the claim. Since the Authority
breaches a duty to the public, here to ensure the repayment of the
public's contribution, the Attorney General has only one possible so-
lution; to renegotiate the leases. Increasing the rents, taking more of
the money that the teams collect from the naming rights to the stadi-
ums and money earned from the sale of alcohol would help allow the
public to recollect most of the money given to the teams. Also, with
the inception of gambling in the Commonwealth, some of the gam-
bling revenue collected could be used to pay down the debt owed by
the teams. Also, by allowing some of the gambling revenues to be
used, the team may be more willing to renegotiate the leases.
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